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Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000200300010-5

DRAFT CABLE

9 February 1967

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FROM: ORR/D/T

1. Following comments represent ORR reaction to MACV proposals outlined in reference.
2. Would like first express hope conference giving consideration determining composition of KIA population, that is, distribution among civilians, irregulars, VC and NVA main forces, support troops, rather than merely manipulating KIA statistical data.
3. MACV KIA/WIA ratio of 1 to 1.44 close to 1 to 1.5 ratio independently derived by ORR. Suggest conference round ratio to 1 to 1.5 for both arithmetic simplicity and to reflect more realistically the true degree of confidence in the precision of these ratios.
4. Estimated MACV attrition factor conceptually similar ORR seriously wounded ratio. ORR seriously wounded includes those dying of wounds and permanently disabled as in MACV ratio but ORR also includes wounded requiring considerable recovery time before returning to action. This inclusion explains why ORR KIA to seriously wounded ratio of 1 to .54-.63 larger than MACV KIA to attrition ratio of 1 to .35.
5. MACV proposals percent enemy OB on duty with unit consistent with ORR thinking on subject although we have made no formal analysis of subject.

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
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6. Disagree MACV position on deserters other than HUI CHANH. Evidence indicates that while VC do not have considerable desertion problems enough local Communist troops go over the hill without reporting to HOI CHANH centers to warrant consideration. We suggest maintain ratio of at least one unknown VC/irregular deserter for every HOI CHANH rallier.

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